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Abstract Physicians in Islamic countries might be requested to participate in the Islamic
legal code of qis
˙
a¯s
˙
, in which the victim or family has the right to an eye-for-an-eye retaliation.
Qis
˙
a¯s
˙
is only used as a punishment in the case of murder or intentional physical injury.
In situations such as throwing acid, the national legal system of some Islamic countries asks
for assistance from physicians, because the punishment should be identical to the crime. The
perpetrator could not be punishedwithout a physician’s participation, because there is noway
to guarantee that the sentence would be carried out without inflicting more injury than the
initial victim had suffered. By examining two cases of acid throwing, this paper discusses
issues related to physicians’ participation in qis
˙
a¯s
˙
from the perspective of medical ethics and
Islamic Shari’a law. From the standpoint of medical ethics, physicians’ participation in qis
˙
a¯s
˙
is not appropriate. First, qis
˙
a¯s
˙
is in sharp contrast to the Hippocratic Oath and other codes of
medical ethics. Second, by physicians’ participation in qis
˙
a¯s
˙
, medical practices are being
used improperly to carry out government mandates. Third, physician participation in
activities that cause intentional harm to people destroys the trust between patients and
physicians andmay adversely affect the patient–physician relationshipmore generally. From
the standpoint of Shari’a, there is no consensus amongMuslim scholars whether qis
˙
a¯s
˙
should
be performed on every occasion.We argue that disallowing physician involvement in qis
˙
a¯s
˙
is
necessary from the perspectives of both medical ethics and Shari’a law.
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Introduction
The Islamic law of qiṣāṣ is a Shari’a-based legal code based on reciprocal justice. In
traditional Islamic societies, the victim or his/her family had the right to eye-for-an-eye
retaliation that remains codified in the modern Islamic legal system as qiṣāṣ. Unlike other
categories of crime in the Islamic penal code, which leaves the administration of pun-
ishment in the hands of the Islamic jurisprudent, the verdict of qiṣāṣ belongs to the
aggrieved. Qiṣāṣ, therefore, emphasize the rights of the victim who can either pardon the
condemned or impose the sentence. Qiṣāṣ only is issued as a punishment in the case of
deliberate killing (qiṣāṣ-from-first-order-killing) and in the case of intentional physical
injury (qiṣāṣ-from-assault-and-battery). In this paper, we mainly focus on the qiṣāṣ-from-
assault-and-battery. By examining two cases of acid throwing, we argue that physicians’
participation in qiṣāṣ is problematic from both a medical ethics perspective and Islamic
Shari’a law, and because of the necessity of physician involvement in qiṣāṣ, this practice
should be abandoned for assault and battery.
Two Acid Throwing Cases in Iran
In October 2004, Majid Movahedi threw a bucket of acid in Ameneh Bahrami’s face after
she rejected his marriage proposal.1 Ameneh subsequently underwent seventeen surgeries
but remains seriously disfigured and blind in both eyes. The Iranian judiciary sentenced
Majid to be blinded by acid based on the provisions of qiṣāṣ (retaliation). After 7 years, in
July 2011, Majid was taken to Tehran’s judiciary hospital to be blinded with acid. How-
ever, Ameneh spared him and halted the qiṣāṣ sentence at the last minute. She said she was
moved to pardon her assailant because the Quran recommends mercy when demanding
qiṣāṣ. Ameneh’s pardon gave her family consolation and produced an inner peace within
her.
The acid thrower in the case of Davood Roshanaei was not as fortunate as Majid.
Davood experience severe and widespread damage to his face, ears, and eyes when his
assailant threw acid on him 10 years ago (approximately the same time as Ameneh’s case).
He was adamant about his right of qiṣāṣ. However, there was no way to guarantee that the
sentence would be carried out without inflicting more injury than the victim had initially
suffered. Therefore, the Iranian juridical system had no way except to alter the punishment
in such a way that it would guarantee that the same injuries would be inflicted as occurred
with the victim. Consequently, the Iranian juridical system decided to use the most
accurate method possible for this punishment: a surgical procedure. This meant that a
group of surgeons would need to carry out a surgery with aim of inflicting intentional
damage to the young man who threw acid on Davood. The Iranian Medical Association
announced that they would not allow the performing of such the maiming surgery because
it conflicted with their code of medical ethics. This case remains open at this time.
1 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jul/31/iran-acid-woman-pardons-attacker.
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Argument from a Medical Ethics Perspective
All major medical associations unanimously condemn physician involvement in any kind
of torturing, maiming, or killing people including capital punishment. Article 2.06 of the
American Medical Association Code of Medical Ethic, states:
A physician, as a member of a profession dedicated to preserving life when there is
hope of doing so, should not be a participant in a legally authorized execution
(American Medical Association 2006).
The logic behind this policy is that the physicians’ participation in capital punishment is
in sharp contrast to the Hippocratic Oath and physician responsibility to “do no harm” and
preserve life whenever possible. The same argument can be applicable to qiṣāṣ for assault
and battery.
The discouragement of physician involvement in capital punishment is a rare instance
where all major schools of medical ethics such as Consequentialism, Principlism, and
Kantianism come to an agreement that physicians should not harm people. The physicians’
participation in capital punishment involves an improper use of medical skills to carry out
a government mandate. By assisting with capital punishment—or in this case qiṣāṣ for
assault and battery—the physician is not using his/her medical knowledge in an ethical
manner. Such actions have consequences more generally for the relationship between
patients and physicians and the role of medicine in a civilized society. People do not trust
or distrust medicine as an institution—they trust or distrust doctors (Needleman 1985). The
relationship between patient and physician must be built on trust. The physician is obli-
gated to place patients’ benefits above their own interests and above the interests of other
stakeholders including the government. We believe that physicians’ participation in
activities that caused intentional harm to people will destroy the trust on which the doctor–
patient relationship is grounded.
However, not all medical practitioners are aligned with their professional organization’s
value and promotion of medical ethics standards. For example, many prisoners were
tortured by using medical techniques during the interrogation of detainees at Guantanamo
Bay. Thousands of girls in the Middle East are mutilated by physicians annually by
surgical procedures involving their genital organs. Millions of Jews were executed and
tortured through the assistance of Nazi doctors during World War II. Many physicians and
nurse practitioners continue to participate in executions around the world. Clinician par-
ticipation in these practices was initially justified by orders from their superior or by
cultural beliefs and traditions. Advocates of these procedures argue that physician aid
during capital punishment spares the prisoner from avoidable agony. They maintain that
the prisoner will be punished as a result of the court’s decision regardless of whether a
physician is involved. Consequently, some physicians believe that it is their responsibility
to lessen the pain of the prisoner who is already condemned to die, and even sometimes
rationalize this decision by referring to the Hippocratic Oath.
The legal system of Islamic countries such as Iran requests assistance from physicians
so that in the case of qiṣāṣ for assault and battery the punishment will be identical to the
crime. The perpetrator cannot be punished without a physician’s participation. At the same
time, nobody has the power to force physicians to participate in qiṣāṣ. Hence, because
physicians have a voluntary role in this process, they have a historic chance to change these
practices.
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In the case of qiṣāṣ for assault and battery, physician organizations could argue that this
practice violates their medical codes of ethics, and therefore make it clear that they will
refuse to engage in this practice if the government requests their involvement or for
cultural or religious reasons. The degree of reversibility of the maiming surgery and hard to
anticipate postoperative complications are the critical issues that must be addressed prior to
such procedures. In the Davood case, many questions come up. Exactly what type of
surgery will be performed: enucleation surgery, cutting the optic nerve, or damaging the
retina? Who is responsible for postoperation complications? Does the perpetrator have the
right to ask for reconstructive surgery immediately after the maiming surgery? If the
perpetrator has no right to ask for reconstructive surgery, and damages supposed to be
irreversible, then what happens if after sometimes Davood with the help of new tech-
nologies can regain his vision? These are questions that are difficult to answer.
Argument from Shari’a Law: Playing God
Some Muslim scholars believe that human enhancement, i.e., the use of science and
technology for changing the human body is against what Islam teaches (Athar 2008;
Sachedina 2009).2 They believe that such practices interfere with God’s authority. There
are also several philosophers such as Sandel (2007), Habermas (2003), Dworkin (2002),
and Cohen (2011) who believe that we should deal with the idea of human enhancement by
addressing questions about the moral status of nature. Michael Sandel, for example, writes:
In order to grapple with the ethics of enhancement, we need to confront questions
largely lost from view—questions about the moral status of nature, and the proper
stance of human beings toward the given world. Since these questions to verge on
theology, modern philosophers, and political theorists tend to shrink from them.
(2007, 9).3
Most of these philosophers believe that using human enhancement is not morally
permissible because by doing so we can be accused of “playing God.” For example,
genetic engineering can help us create smarter and stronger children. Playing God is
forbidden in Islam and other monotheistic religions. These philosophers and scholars find
the idea of human enhancement terrifying, and that “Playing God” is a “dangerous cliche´”
(Coady 2009).4
However, if it is true that using human enhancement is against God’s authority, why
using human detraction (anti-enhancement) is not against God’s authority? That is, if using
modern technology to enhance one’s future is against God’s authority, why using modern
technology to do qiṣāṣ-from-assault-and-battery and detract one’s future is not against
God’s authority? For instance, in the case of acid throwing, a physician needs to use some
modern technology to remove some parts of the perpetrator. If so, attaining qiṣāṣ-from-
assault-and-battery is against God’s authority and could be inconsistent with God’s
authority. This leads us to conclude that attaining qis
˙
a¯s
˙
especially in the case of assault and
battery is in fact playing God in this world. Qiṣāṣ-from-assault-and-battery is a form of
2 Quran (4:119).
3 For more details on Sandel’s argument and its criticisms, see Kahane (2011, 2013).
4 http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/blog/playing-god-is-a-meaningless-dangerous-cliche/#. UhYYSpJOS
8A and http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2010/05/is-playing-god-just-a-meaningless-phrase/
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“playing God” in the sense that by doing qiṣāṣ we are in fact playing as God, i.e., taking the
role of God. However, the idea of playing God can be a severe challenge for the religious
perspective. Here is why.
Believers (Muslims) think that there are certain things in this world of human beings
which are God’s right, not ours. Consequently, God does make a decision about them and
we are not entitled to take care of them. In fact, the theological concept of “providence”
works here to explain why these theistic believers endorse such claim. All theistic religions
(including Islam), on one interpretation, advise their followers that one of these certain
things that God has right to take care of, among other things, is the control of the creation.
Unlike philosophers who thought that God is a “retired architecture,” theistic religions
believe that God did not only make the world. Rather, like Isaac Newton who thought that
we need God to have a persistent account of time and space, believers think that God
protects, cares, guides, and preserves the world all the time. For example, in Islam, Quran
emphasizes that God cannot become tired and every day He is working for His plan: “And
indeed We already created the heavens and the earth and whatever is between them in
6 days, and in no way has any fatigue touched Us” (50:38).5
Nevertheless, there might be an objection that how can participate in qiṣāṣ is against
God’s authority when God generally prescribes the idea of qiṣāṣ, in the Holy text. It seems
that it is not against God’s authority.
There are several verses in Quran talking about qiṣāṣ in both senses of qiṣāṣ-from-first-
order-killing and qiṣāṣ-from-assault-and-battery. For example, we read in the Quran:
And We ordained for them therein a life for a life, an eye for an eye, a nose for a
nose, an ear for an ear, a tooth for a tooth, and for wounds is legal retribution. But
whoever gives [up his right as] charity, it is an expiation for him. And whoever does
not judge by what Allah has revealed—then it is those who are the wrongdoers
(5:45).6
However, these types of verses should be rationally and expertly interpreted. Inter-
pretations of such controversial verses provide us a reason to either believe the content as it
is or make some amendments to be acceptable.
Muslim scholars and Ulamā, especially in the Shīa School, believe that we can suspend
temporarily certain religious judgments (aḥkām) mentioned in the Quran. These Shīas tend
to believe that in the absence of the Innocent Imam some rituals are not obligated. As an
example, most Shīas tend to believe that the Friday prayer, in the absence of the Innocent
Imam, is not necessary. They do not practice the Friday prayer even though it is explicitly
said in the Quran.7 Among these Muslim Shīas, there are also some who believe that qiṣāṣ,
in both senses, can be suspended. They believe that for participating in qiṣāṣ we need the
Twelfth Innocent Imam’s judgment (hukm), but since he is not present at the moment we
should suspend our judgment about qiṣāṣ until he appears again (Khansary 1405/1985).8
Moreover, Muslim intellectuals make a distinction between two types of punishment
derived from political philosophy and philosophy of law: “punishment based on deter-
rence” and “punishment based on desert” (Soroush 2009, 2002). These scholars believe
5 See also Quran (2:255) and (55:29).
6 See also Quran (2:178–179).
7 Quran (62:9).
8 One can object that Sunni Muslims will not accept this argument as it is not applicable to them. Although
this can be true, we do not intend to discuss the tension between these two schools in here. All we want to do
is making a room for an interpretation according to which some Quranic judgments can be suspended.
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that the idea of punishment (including qiṣāṣ), as it is in the Quran, is more based on
deterrence rather than desert.9 This entails that qiṣāṣ should be participated in the public so
as to prevent others from doing the same crime. If so, one might raise the doubt that
although attaining qiṣāṣ had preventive effects in the past, there is no reason to believe that
qiṣāṣ has the same preventive effect in the modern society. These Muslim intellectuals
even believe that attaining qiṣāṣ might resemble of torturing in the modern society. Fur-
thermore, we do not have any statistics showing that doing any sorts of qiṣāṣ leads our
societies to a better society with lesser crimes.
There is also another concern raised by these new Muslim scholars according to which
by participating in qiṣāṣ-from-assault-and-battery, in large scale, we will have more par-
alyzed and disable people in our societies. Certainly, societies with more incapable people
have more difficulties for the government to take care of them. So, it is not reasonable to
pursue such activity.
Finally, as it is said in the Shari’a law, for attaining any kinds of qiṣāṣ people who are
responsible, e.g., “legal guardian” or “avenger of blood” must perform the qiṣāṣ, not the
government. In modern societies in which the idea of “nation-state distinction” becomes a
necessary element for governing, attaining qiṣāṣ can be very problematic. Because, on the
one hand, government cannot do the qiṣāṣ and it is avenger of blood’s responsibility to do
that. On the other hand, government cannot allow individuals to participate in qis
˙
a¯s
˙
pri-
vately as this makes societies unsafe and lawless. This leads us to think that we should
consider the idea of qiṣāṣ as a historical concept which might have some place in the past
but it has no place in our time.
Conclusion
Physician participation in qiṣāṣ-from-assault-and-battery is neither acceptable from a
medical ethics perspective nor from the perspective of many Shari’a law scholars.
Physician participation in qiṣāṣ-from-assault-and-battery is against the Hippocratic Oath
and the ethical codes of many medical organizations. There is no justification for muti-
lating a human body in the name of revenge or justice. In Shari’a law there is no consensus
among Ulamā on whether qiṣāṣ should be administered on every occasion. In fact, there
are some Muslim scholars who believe that suspending qiṣāṣ is permissible in our time
because by performing qiṣāṣ-from-assault-and-battery we are actually taking on the
authority of God in this world, which is explicitly against the core principles of Islam.
Eventually, it may be physicians themselves who have the final say as to whether or not
government-mandated qiṣāṣ continue in contemporary society. We believe that the medical
community has an obligation to oppose rules and regulations that are ethically wrong.
Physicians will be called on to make a choice in the cases like the ones described in this
essay and we hope they will choose responsibly and ethically.
9 Quran (24:2).
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